Robustness in mechanism design and contracting
G Carroll - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …
[PDF][PDF] Algorithmic game theory
T Roughgarden - Communications of the ACM, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Algorithmic game theory Page 1 78 communications of the acm | july 2010 | vol. 53 | no. 7 review
articles The widespread adopTioN of the Internet and the emergence of the Web changed …
articles The widespread adopTioN of the Internet and the emergence of the Web changed …
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism
design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to …
design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to …
Quality of information aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing systems
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems,
which leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices for large scale …
which leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices for large scale …
Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations
M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on …, 2021 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private
preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous …
preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous …
Enabling privacy-preserving incentives for mobile crowd sensing systems
Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that
leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices (eg, smartphones …
leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices (eg, smartphones …
Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming
R Lavi, C Swamy - Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2011 - dl.acm.org
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in
expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also …
expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also …
Transactive energy for flexible prosumers using algorithmic game theory
G Tsaousoglou, P Pinson… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In modern smart grids, the focus is increasingly shifted towards distributed energy resources
and flexible electricity assets owned by prosumers. A system with high penetration of flexible …
and flexible electricity assets owned by prosumers. A system with high penetration of flexible …
Thanos: Incentive mechanism with quality awareness for mobile crowd sensing
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems,
which leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices for large scale …
which leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices for large scale …
[PDF][PDF] Mechanism design and approximation
JD Hartline - Book draft. October, 2013 - jasonhartline.com
This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …