Robustness in mechanism design and contracting

G Carroll - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …

[PDF][PDF] Algorithmic game theory

T Roughgarden - Communications of the ACM, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Algorithmic game theory Page 1 78 communications of the acm | july 2010 | vol. 53 | no. 7 review
articles The widespread adopTioN of the Internet and the emergence of the Web changed …

Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing

S Chawla, JD Hartline, DL Malec, B Sivan - Proceedings of the forty …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism
design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to …

Quality of information aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing systems

H Jin, L Su, D Chen, K Nahrstedt, J Xu - Proceedings of the 16th ACM …, 2015 - dl.acm.org
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems,
which leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices for large scale …

Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations

M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on …, 2021 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private
preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous …

Enabling privacy-preserving incentives for mobile crowd sensing systems

H Jin, L Su, B Ding, K Nahrstedt… - 2016 IEEE 36th …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that
leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices (eg, smartphones …

Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming

R Lavi, C Swamy - Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2011 - dl.acm.org
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in
expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also …

Transactive energy for flexible prosumers using algorithmic game theory

G Tsaousoglou, P Pinson… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In modern smart grids, the focus is increasingly shifted towards distributed energy resources
and flexible electricity assets owned by prosumers. A system with high penetration of flexible …

Thanos: Incentive mechanism with quality awareness for mobile crowd sensing

H Jin, L Su, D Chen, H Guo… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2018 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems,
which leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices for large scale …

[PDF][PDF] Mechanism design and approximation

JD Hartline - Book draft. October, 2013 - jasonhartline.com
This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …