Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality

A Perea - Games and Economic Behavior, 2014 - Elsevier
For dynamic games we consider the idea that a player, at every stage of the game, will
always believe that his opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the …

[图书][B] Numerical Methods of Optimization

JP Corriou, JP Corriou - 2021 - Springer
The numerical methods of optimization start with optimizing functions of one variable,
bisection, Fibonacci, and Newton. Then, functions of several variables occupy the main part …

What eye movements can tell about theory of mind in a strategic game

B Meijering, H Van Rijn, NA Taatgen, R Verbrugge - 2012 - journals.plos.org
This study investigates strategies in reasoning about mental states of others, a process that
requires theory of mind. It is a first step in studying the cognitive basis of such reasoning, as …

Why do contracts between airlines and airports fail?

C Barbot, T D'Alfonso - Research in Transportation Economics, 2014 - Elsevier
We investigate the sustainability of vertical contracts between airports and airlines. We focus
on the case of Quantity Forcing contracts, with a theoretical model that accommodates …

Strategic reasoning: Building cognitive models from logical formulas

S Ghosh, B Meijering, R Verbrugge - Journal of Logic, Language and …, 2014 - Springer
This paper presents an attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments
of strategic reasoning in games. There have been extensive formal debates about the merits …

Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games

G Bonanno - Games, 2022 - mdpi.com
We argue in favor of a departure from the equilibrium approach in game theory towards the
less ambitious goal of describing only the actual behavior of rational players. The notions of …

A game theory competitive intelligence solution stimulated from a Stackelberg game: A three players scenario

DB Sassi, M Chaieb - Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 2024 - Elsevier
Competitive Intelligence (CI) involves systematically gathering information about the
competitive landscape to anticipate rivals' decisions and secure a strategic advantage. As …

A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction

G Bonanno - Games and Economic Behavior, 2014 - Elsevier
We investigate an extension of the notion of backward induction to dynamic games with
imperfect information and provide a doxastic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of …

[PDF][PDF] Logic Meets Cognition: Empirical Reasoning in Games.

S Ghosh, B Meijering, R Verbrugge - MALLOW, 2010 - academia.edu
This paper presents a first attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive
treatments of strategic reasoning in games. The focus of the paper is backward induction, a …

Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games

A Perea - Models of Strategic Reasoning: Logics, Games, and …, 2015 - Springer
In this chapter we focus on the epistemic concept of common belief in future rationality
(Perea [37]), which describes a backward induction type of reasoning for general dynamic …