Belief elicitation in the laboratory
A Schotter, I Trevino - Annu. Rev. Econ., 2014 - annualreviews.org
One constraint we face as economists is not being able to observe all the relevant variables
required to test our theories or make policy prescriptions. Laboratory techniques allow us to …
required to test our theories or make policy prescriptions. Laboratory techniques allow us to …
Belief-dependent motivations and psychological game theory
P Battigalli, M Dufwenberg - Journal of Economic Literature, 2022 - aeaweb.org
The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many
forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on one's own or others' beliefs. It …
forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on one's own or others' beliefs. It …
Deception: The role of guilt
Deception: The role of guilt - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier logo
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Promises and expectations
F Ederer, A Stremitzer - Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 - Elsevier
We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement
mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that …
mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that …
Social preferences: fundamental characteristics and economic consequences
E Fehr, G Charness - Available at SSRN 4464745, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their
fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences …
fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences …
Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence
People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and
Dufwenberg, 2007), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes …
Dufwenberg, 2007), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes …
[HTML][HTML] Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect
MA Costa-Gomes, S Huck, G Weizsäcker - Games and Economic Behavior, 2014 - Elsevier
In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant
events, eg about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments asks …
events, eg about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments asks …
Embezzlement and guilt aversion
Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by
providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral …
providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral …
Promises, expectations & causation
Why do people keep their promises? Vanberg (2008) and Ederer and Stremitzer (2017)
provide causal evidence in favor of, respectively, an intrinsic preference for keeping one's …
provide causal evidence in favor of, respectively, an intrinsic preference for keeping one's …
Incomplete-information models of guilt aversion in the trust game
In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players' preferences on material
consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical …
consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical …