We provide a model of electoral competition between an establishment and an outsider
candidate in which each candidate has a fixed characteristic that voters care about and …

We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a
partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates …

We present a model of electoral competition with endogenous platforms and campaign
spending where the division of voters between impressionable and ideological is also …

In the context of politics, the term valence was first introduced by Stokes (1963) in his critique
of the Downsian (spatial) model of political competition. 1 The term,“borrowed from …

We study an electoral competition model in which each voter is characterized by income
level and non-economic characteristics, and where two vote share maximizing candidates …

Pure-strategy Nash equilibria almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the
number of positional dimensions is at least two, as the majority core is typically empty when …

We analyze a two‐candidate Downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts (eg,
interest‐group/media endorsements) to infer candidates' policy platforms. That is, voters do …

Different voters might have different valuations of candidates' qualitative features. We argue
that this intuitive fact acts as a strong stabilizing force in electoral competition dynamics …

We consider two-stage electoral competitions with strategic voters, investigating the effects
of valence (ie, a candidate's personal quality) on policy polarization. In our model, two …

The effect of electoral rules on voter turnout has been extensively studied. 1 Most empirical
studies tend to report a regularity that can be summarized as follows: more proportional …