We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the
extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' …

Abstract The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on “Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism
Design” of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism …

We analyze the effect of handicaps on turnout. A handicap is a difference in the vote tally
between alternatives that is added to the vote tally generated by voters. Handicaps are …

Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents
must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does …

How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision
process is voluntary and costly, and monetary transfers are not feasible? Assuming …

We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their
preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all …

Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections, we study how participation quorum
requirements affect voters' decisions to cast votes, and how they ultimately impact voter and …

The literature on implementation has focused mainly on cases in which agents have both
agency over their actions and over the time at which they commit to their actions. We take as …

We study vote delegation and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote
delegation are validation or governance tasks on blockchains and liquid democracy. There …

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout
and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority'problem. The present paper studies …