We provide an introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design, with
a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) …

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the
extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' …

Information design in multistage games - Makris - 2023 - Theoretical Economics - Wiley Online
Library Skip to Article Content Skip to Article Information Wiley Online Library Wiley Online …

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for
sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The …

It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels—monitoring of competitors' prices,
sales, and profits—facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have …

Firms in developing countries often face concentrated input markets and contracting
frictions. This paper studies the efficiency of self-enforced long-term relationships between …

How should mediators communicate with bargainers? When can they improve outcomes?
Can arbitrators that impose outcomes do better? I provide answers in wars of attrition with …

We explore two highly interrelated models of “hard information.” In the evidence–acquisition
model, an agent with private information searches for evidence to show to the principal …

The very first paper published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics,“Subjectivity and
correlation in randomized strategies”, by Aumann, proposes a new approach to strategic …

An analyst observes an agent take a sequence of actions. The analyst does not have access
to the agent's information and ponders whether the observed actions could be justified …