Product innovation in a supply chain with information asymmetry: Is more private information always worse?

J Ni, Y Xu, J Shi, J Li - European Journal of Operational Research, 2024 - Elsevier
This study investigates supply chain innovation under different degrees of information
asymmetry. The supplier could be uncertain about either the manufacturer's production cost …

Supply contracting and process innovation in a dynamic supply chain with information asymmetry

J Ni, J Zhao, LK Chu - European Journal of Operational Research, 2021 - Elsevier
We investigate the process innovation and contracting decisions of a dynamic supply chain
consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer, with the manufacturer possessing private …

Real options signaling games with applications to corporate finance

SR Grenadier, A Malenko - The Review of Financial Studies, 2011 - academic.oup.com
We study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information
to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the utility of the decision-maker. Signaling incentives distort …

Venture capital exit after venture IPO

Y Li, T Chi, S Lan, Q Wang - Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2024 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Research Summary Venture capital firms (VCs) sometimes continue to hold
significant equity stakes in entrepreneurial ventures after venture IPO. The information …

Theories of financing for entrepreneurial firms: a review

A Miglo - Forthcoming in International Review of …, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
This article provides an overview of literature related to capital structure theories for
entrepreneurial firms. It identifies gaps and controversial areas in existing literature and also …

Financing innovation: A bibliometric analysis of the field

AM Padilla-Ospina, JE Medina-Vásquez… - Journal of Business & …, 2018 - Taylor & Francis
This article presents a bibliometric analysis of the financing of innovation during the period
2001–2016. Among the most prominent journals in the field are Research Policy …

Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning

R Gomes, D Gottlieb, L Maestri - Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 - Elsevier
Firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well-known business
models and the exploration of risky, untested approaches. In this paper, we study financial …

More haste, less speed? signaling through investment timing

C Bobtcheff, R Levy - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017 - aeaweb.org
We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a
privately known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be …

Investment Busts, Reputation, and the Temptation to Blend in with the Crowd

SR Grenadier, A Malenko, IA Strebulaev - Journal of Financial Economics, 2014 - Elsevier
We provide a real-options model of an industry in which agents time abandonment of their
projects in an effort to protect their reputations. Agents delay abandonment attempting to …

风险投资三方委托代理关系——基于创业企业家过度自信与风投公司监督努力

查博a - 系统管理学报, 2015 - xtglxb.sjtu.edu.cn
在不完全信息条件下, 建立了风险投资公司, 银行与创业企业三者之间的委托代理模型,
证明了风险投资公司的监督比例存在一个临界值, 并分析了创业企业家过度自信心理特征与风险 …