We provide evidence that German savings banks, which are controlled by county-level
politicians, systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles. The …

Recent formal models of accountability allow us to make different conditional predictions
about how transparency affects voters' willingness to re-elect incumbents and acceptance of …

We provide evidence that German public energy providers, over which municipality-level
politicians hold substantial sway, systematically adjust the pricing of electric energy in …

Consider a politician who has to take two sequential decisions during his term in office. For
each decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the …

Consider a politician who has to take several decisions during his term in office. For each
decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the right …

This thesis studies the role of information on the promotion of political accountability using
empirical analysis of data from Brazil. The first chapter investigates whether the use of …

We provide causal evidence that German savings banks where local politicians are by law
involved in their management systematically adjust lending policies in response to local …