Could a person or mind be uploaded—transmitted to a computer or network—and thereby
survive bodily death? I argue “mind uploading” is possible only if a mind is an abstract object …

In his work on personal identity, Derek Parfit makes two revolutionary claims: firstly, that
personal identity is not what matters in survival; and secondly, that what does matter is …

How we maintain the continuity of our personal identity, that is, how we stay the same
person throughout our lives–if we do–is one of philosophy's toughest problems. Overcoming …

It is intuitive to suppose that the question of whether I persist through a given period will
always have a metaphysically substantive 'yes' or 'no'answer. Derek Parfit challenges this …

Parfit argues that if we come to believe his theory of personal identity, we should care
differently about the future. Amongst others, we can redescribe death in ways that make it …

I provide a simple solution to the problem of determining the characterising feature (s) of the
simple approach to personal identity, sometimes also called the simple view: instead of …

The A and B-theorists of time disagree over whether time passes in reality. The B-theorist
denies it does, and so, despite its successes, stands at an intuitive disadvantage. The A …