Theories of oligopoly behavior

C Shapiro - Handbook of industrial organization, 1989 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary The study of oligopolistic industries lies at the heart of the field of
industrial organization. The belief of an individual about the behavior of large firms in …

[PDF][PDF] Detecting cartels

JE Harrington - 2005 - econstor.eu
Detecting cartels Page 1 Harrington, Joseph E. Working Paper Detecting cartels Working Paper,
No. 526 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University …

Long-run competition in capacity, short-run competition in price, and the Cournot model

C Davidson, R Deneckere - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
In this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the
scale of operation before they make pricing decisions. We analyze a duopoly model in …

[图书][B] Topics in microeconomics: Industrial organization, auctions, and incentives

E Wolfstetter - 1999 - books.google.com
This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect
competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect …

Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion

O Compte, F Jenny, P Rey - European Economic Review, 2002 - Elsevier
The objective of this paper is two-fold: to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in
Bertrand supergames with (asymmetric) capacity constraints and, from a more applied …

The economics of tacit collusion: implications for merger control

M Ivaldi, B Jullien, P Rey, P Seabright… - Contributions to Economic …, 2007 - Elsevier
Tacit collusion refers to a group of oligopolists' ability to coordinate, even in the absence of
explicit agreement, 2 to raise price or more generally increase profit at the detriment of …

Price leadership

RJ Deneckere, D Kovenock - The Review of Economic Studies, 1992 - academic.oup.com
This paper analyzes duopolistic price-leadership games in which firms have capacity
constraints. We provide a complete characterization of price leader equilibria under quite …

Exploring the dilemma of overcapacity governance in China's coal industry: a tripartite evolutionary game model

Y Wang, D Wang, X Shi - Resources Policy, 2021 - Elsevier
Coal overcapacity reduction is an essential part of China's energy transition. An effective
governance model is a key to realizing the smooth exit of excess coal capacity. We construct …

A dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars

C Fershtman, A Pakes - 1999 - nber.org
Most of the theoretical work on collusion and price wars assumes identical firms and an
unchanging environment, assumptions which are at odds with what we know about most …

The role of feed-in tariff in the curtailment of wind power in China

F Xia, X Lu, F Song - Energy Economics, 2020 - Elsevier
While China's wind power initiative has experienced rapid growth, serious curtailment
issues persist. Though some studies have investigated this matter, we explain this …