Theories of oligopoly behavior
C Shapiro - Handbook of industrial organization, 1989 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary The study of oligopolistic industries lies at the heart of the field of
industrial organization. The belief of an individual about the behavior of large firms in …
industrial organization. The belief of an individual about the behavior of large firms in …
[PDF][PDF] Detecting cartels
JE Harrington - 2005 - econstor.eu
Detecting cartels Page 1 Harrington, Joseph E. Working Paper Detecting cartels Working Paper,
No. 526 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University …
No. 526 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University …
Long-run competition in capacity, short-run competition in price, and the Cournot model
C Davidson, R Deneckere - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
In this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the
scale of operation before they make pricing decisions. We analyze a duopoly model in …
scale of operation before they make pricing decisions. We analyze a duopoly model in …
[图书][B] Topics in microeconomics: Industrial organization, auctions, and incentives
E Wolfstetter - 1999 - books.google.com
This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect
competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect …
competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect …
Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion
O Compte, F Jenny, P Rey - European Economic Review, 2002 - Elsevier
The objective of this paper is two-fold: to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in
Bertrand supergames with (asymmetric) capacity constraints and, from a more applied …
Bertrand supergames with (asymmetric) capacity constraints and, from a more applied …
The economics of tacit collusion: implications for merger control
Tacit collusion refers to a group of oligopolists' ability to coordinate, even in the absence of
explicit agreement, 2 to raise price or more generally increase profit at the detriment of …
explicit agreement, 2 to raise price or more generally increase profit at the detriment of …
Price leadership
RJ Deneckere, D Kovenock - The Review of Economic Studies, 1992 - academic.oup.com
This paper analyzes duopolistic price-leadership games in which firms have capacity
constraints. We provide a complete characterization of price leader equilibria under quite …
constraints. We provide a complete characterization of price leader equilibria under quite …
Exploring the dilemma of overcapacity governance in China's coal industry: a tripartite evolutionary game model
Coal overcapacity reduction is an essential part of China's energy transition. An effective
governance model is a key to realizing the smooth exit of excess coal capacity. We construct …
governance model is a key to realizing the smooth exit of excess coal capacity. We construct …
A dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars
C Fershtman, A Pakes - 1999 - nber.org
Most of the theoretical work on collusion and price wars assumes identical firms and an
unchanging environment, assumptions which are at odds with what we know about most …
unchanging environment, assumptions which are at odds with what we know about most …
The role of feed-in tariff in the curtailment of wind power in China
While China's wind power initiative has experienced rapid growth, serious curtailment
issues persist. Though some studies have investigated this matter, we explain this …
issues persist. Though some studies have investigated this matter, we explain this …