Implementation theory
E Maskin, T Sjöström - Handbook of social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …
Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality
E Maskin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - academic.oup.com
If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each
potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set …
potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set …
Implementation theory
TR Palfrey - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2002 - Elsevier
Chapter 61 Implementation theory - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier
logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF Download full volume Search …
logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF Download full volume Search …
A crash course in implementation theory
MO Jackson - Social choice and welfare, 2001 - Springer
A crash course in implementation theory Page 1 Soc Choice Welfare 2001) 18: 655±708 9999
2001 A crash course in implementation theory Matthew O. Jackson Humanities and Social …
2001 A crash course in implementation theory Matthew O. Jackson Humanities and Social …
Fair allocation rules
W Thomson - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2011 - Elsevier
We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource
allocations. We present punctual notions designed to evaluate how well individuals, or …
allocations. We present punctual notions designed to evaluate how well individuals, or …
Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded mechanisms
MO Jackson - The Review of Economic Studies, 1992 - academic.oup.com
This paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms
considered for implementation problems. It is shown that if all mechanisms are considered …
considered for implementation problems. It is shown that if all mechanisms are considered …
Implementation and renegotiation
E Maskin, J Moore - The Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - academic.oup.com
Implementation and Renegotiation | The Review of Economic Studies | Oxford Academic Skip
to Main Content Advertisement Oxford Academic Journals Books Search Menu Information …
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Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information
J Moore, JJ Laffont - … in Economic Theory: Invited Papers for the …, 1992 - research.ed.ac.uk
There are two parts to this paper. Part One introduces the subject of implementation, and
provides applications (in particular, to the theory of contracts). This part is written so as to be …
provides applications (in particular, to the theory of contracts). This part is written so as to be …
Bayesian implementation
MO Jackson - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1991 - JSTOR
The subject of this paper is the decentralization of decision making when agents have
information which is incomplete and possibly exclusive. The first theorem states that in …
information which is incomplete and possibly exclusive. The first theorem states that in …
A network approach to public goods
An economy can be thought of as a network in which the nodes are agents and links among
them represent heterogeneous opportunities for exchange or cooperation. This paper …
them represent heterogeneous opportunities for exchange or cooperation. This paper …