Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly
human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a …

Tomasello (2020) argues that a sense of moral obligation emerges from the creation of a
collaborative “we” motivating us to fulfill our cooperative duties. We suggest that “we” takes …

Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier
publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the …

Abstract Tinbergen's classic “On Aims and Methods of Ethology”(Zeitschrift für
Tierpsychologie, 20, 1963) proposed four levels of explanation of behavior, which he …

Is it particularly human to feel coerced into fulfilling moral obligations, or is it particularly
human to enjoy them? I argue for the importance of taking into account how culture …

In place of Tomasello's explanation for the source of moral obligation, we suggest that it
develops from the concern for others already implicit in the human developmental system …

The role of affect in feelings of obligation Page 1 reliance on experimental findings raises the
question of how well the account tallies with real-life observations. I suggest that complementary …

Morality has two key features:(1) moral judgments are not solely determined by what your
group thinks, and (2) moral judgments are often applied to members of other groups as well …

California, Los Angeles, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553 USA Abstract: We
extend Tomasello's framework by addressing the functional challenge of obligation. If the …

The integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information within joint intentional
collaboration provides the foundation for broad-based second-personal morality. We offer …