I develop a theory of stock-based compensation contracts for the chief executive officers
(CEOs) of firms and confront the theoretical predictions with recent CEO compensation data …

We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly
competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract …

This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve
the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement …

We examine the importance of stockholder–bondholder conflicts in capital-structure choice.
Numerical techniques are used to compute the expected wealth transfer between …

We test the predictions of Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) by
examining the effect of leverage on labor costs. Leverage has a significantly positive impact …

A vast theoretical and empirical literature in corporate finance considers the
interrelationships of corporate governance, takeovers, management turnover, corporate …

This paper examines how corporate control is exerted in companies listed on the Brussels
Stock Exchange. There are several alternative corporate governance mechanisms which …

This paper studies separation payments made when CEOs leave their firms. In a sample of
179 exiting Fortune 500 CEOs, more than half receive severance pay and the mean …

We examine the relation between managerial ability and firm performance during the 2008
global financial crisis. We find that managerial ability is positively associated with firm …

CEO severance has captured the attention of a wide array of audiences, yet it remains
largely unexplored by management scholars. In this article we offer a rigorous theoretical …