The economics of crowdfunding platforms
This paper provides a description of the crowdfunding sector, considering investment-based
crowdfunding platforms as well as platforms in which funders do not obtain monetary …
crowdfunding platforms as well as platforms in which funders do not obtain monetary …
Ratings quality over the business cycle
H Bar-Isaac, J Shapiro - Journal of Financial Economics, 2013 - Elsevier
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have long held that reputational concerns discipline their
behavior. The value of reputation, however, depends on economic fundamentals that vary …
behavior. The value of reputation, however, depends on economic fundamentals that vary …
Access denied: How equity crowdfunding platforms use quality signals to select new ventures
Among the new ventures actively seeking funds through equity crowdfunding, only a lucky
few seemingly survive the rigorous selection process imposed by equity crowdfunding …
few seemingly survive the rigorous selection process imposed by equity crowdfunding …
Platform governance
TH Teh - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 - aeaweb.org
Platforms that intermediate trades—such as Amazon, Airbnb, and eBay—play a regulatory
role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to …
role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to …
The labor market for directors and externalities in corporate governance
This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate
governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and …
governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and …
Why do firms issue green bonds?
Green bonds allow firms to commit to climate-friendly projects. Equity investors react
positively to their announcement. Based on prior empirical studies, we suggest that green …
positively to their announcement. Based on prior empirical studies, we suggest that green …
Fear of rejection? Tiered certification and transparency
Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants/sellers for
three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from …
three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from …
Repeated interaction and rating inflation: A model of double reputation
S Frenkel - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015 - aeaweb.org
Credit rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among
investors but also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency …
investors but also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency …
The economics of credit rating agencies
F Sangiorgi, C Spatt - Foundations and Trends® in Finance, 2017 - nowpublishers.com
We explore through both an economics and regulatory lens the frictions associated with
credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public …
credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public …