The economics of crowdfunding platforms

P Belleflamme, N Omrani, M Peitz - Information Economics and Policy, 2015 - Elsevier
This paper provides a description of the crowdfunding sector, considering investment-based
crowdfunding platforms as well as platforms in which funders do not obtain monetary …

Ratings quality over the business cycle

H Bar-Isaac, J Shapiro - Journal of Financial Economics, 2013 - Elsevier
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have long held that reputational concerns discipline their
behavior. The value of reputation, however, depends on economic fundamentals that vary …

Access denied: How equity crowdfunding platforms use quality signals to select new ventures

S Kleinert, J Bafera, D Urbig… - … Theory and Practice, 2022 - journals.sagepub.com
Among the new ventures actively seeking funds through equity crowdfunding, only a lucky
few seemingly survive the rigorous selection process imposed by equity crowdfunding …

Platform governance

TH Teh - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 - aeaweb.org
Platforms that intermediate trades—such as Amazon, Airbnb, and eBay—play a regulatory
role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to …

The labor market for directors and externalities in corporate governance

D Levit, N Malenko - The Journal of Finance, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate
governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and …

Why do firms issue green bonds?

JX Daubanes, SF Mitali, JC Rochet - Swiss Finance Institute …, 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
Green bonds allow firms to commit to climate-friendly projects. Equity investors react
positively to their announcement. Based on prior empirical studies, we suggest that green …

Creating controversy in proxy voting advice

A Malenko, N Malenko, CS Spatt - 2021 - nber.org
We analyze the design of recommendations (available to all shareholders) and research
reports (available only to subscribers) by a proxy advisor, who maximizes profits from selling …

Fear of rejection? Tiered certification and transparency

E Farhi, J Lerner, J Tirole - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants/sellers for
three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from …

Repeated interaction and rating inflation: A model of double reputation

S Frenkel - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015 - aeaweb.org
Credit rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among
investors but also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency …

The economics of credit rating agencies

F Sangiorgi, C Spatt - Foundations and Trends® in Finance, 2017 - nowpublishers.com
We explore through both an economics and regulatory lens the frictions associated with
credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public …