Most of what we know is supported by beliefs formed fairly directly from sense perception.
Many such beliefs constitute knowledge. Over its history, philosophy has not done well in …

Ted is on his way to the Philosophy Department, early in the freezing morning. Although he
doesn't know how cold it is, Ted conjectures that the temperature must be below 0 C. Out of …

Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent's internal states that
explains why only these states can play whatever role the internalist thinks these states are …

Dogmatism holds that an experience or seeming that p can provide prima facie immediate
justification for believing p in virtue of its phenomenology. Dogmatism about perceptual …

Rational agents have (more or less) consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of
consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to …

Perceptual experiences justify beliefs. A perceptual experience of a dog justifies the belief
that there is a dog present. But there is much evidence that perceptual states can occur …

Roger White objects to interval‐valued credence theories because they produce a
counterintuitive “dilation” effect in a story he calls the Coin Game. We respond that results in …

In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to
which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called …

The perennial question of the nature of natural-language understanding has received
renewed attention in recent years. Two kinds of natural-language understanding, in …

Phenomenal conservatives claim that seemings are sui generis mental states and can thus
provide foundational non-doxastic justification for beliefs. Many of their critics deny this …