Since the advent of Spectre, a number of counter-measures have been proposed and
deployed. Rigorously reasoning about their effectiveness, however, requires a well-defined …

The constant-time discipline is a software-based countermeasure used for protecting high
assurance cryptographic implementations against timing side-channel attacks. Constant …

Since the discovery of Spectre, a large number of hardware mechanisms for secure
speculation has been proposed. Intuitively, more defensive mechanisms are less efficient …

We propose leakage containment models (LCMs)---novel axiomatic security contracts which
support formally reasoning about the security guarantees of programs when they run on …

We introduce Blade, a new approach to automatically and efficiently eliminate speculative
leaks from cryptographic code. Blade is built on the insight that to stop leaks via speculative …

The recent Spectre attacks have demonstrated the fundamental insecurity of current
computer microarchitecture. The attacks use features like pipelining, out-of-order and …

Spectre vulnerabilities violate our fundamental assumptions about architectural abstractions,
allowing attackers to steal sensitive data despite previously state-of-the-art …

Modern processors employ different speculation mechanisms to speculate over different
kinds of instructions. Attackers can exploit these mechanisms simultaneously in order to …

The SPECTRE family of speculative execution attacks has required a rethinking of formal
methods for security. Approaches based on operational speculative semantics have made …

High-assurance cryptography leverages methods from program verification and
cryptography engineering to deliver efficient cryptographic software with machine-checked …