We study a principal–agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from
output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning …

We study a dynamic principal-agent/firm-CEO relationship that is subject simultaneously to
moral hazard, limited commitment, and shocks to the CEO's market value. Termination is …

We consider a robust contract with limited commitment in continuous time, in which the
principal (firm) is ambiguity averse and seeks robust decisions. First, we find the existence of …

This paper examines the impact of managerial labor market competition on executive
incentive contracts. I develop a dynamic contracting model that incorporates moral hazard …

This article studies dynamic compensation and risk management under cash-flow volatility
shocks. The optimal contract depends critically on firms' ability to make good on promised …

In contractual relationships where the agent executes numerous independent tasks over the
lifetime of the contract, it is often infeasible to evaluate his performance on all tasks that he is …

This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized
to simultaneously work and exert effort to invest in human capital or process innovation so …

In this paper, we show that whenever the agent's outside option is nonzero, the optimal
contract in the continuous-time principal-agent model of Sannikov (2008) is reflective at the …

We study an optimal long-term labor contract that provides disability insurance benefits
under two frictions: the agent cannot commit to a long-term contract and the disability shock …

Suomalaisten korkeakouluopiskelijoiden voidaan havaita valmistuvan tutkinnostaan
keskimäärin vanhempina verrattuna muihin Pohjoismaihin tai OECD-maiden keskiarvoon …