We build a game-theoretic model to examine how better demand forecasting resulting from
algorithms, machine learning, and artificial intelligence affects the sustainability of collusion …

This chapter examines recent developments in economic research relating to antitrust,
paying specific attention to research in the areas of collusion and merger enforcement …

We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a
public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of …

We investigate the allegation that legacy US airlines communicated via earnings calls to
coordinate with other legacy airlines in offering fewer seats on competitive routes. To this …

A theory is developed to explain how sellers can effectively collude by coordinating on list
prices (or surcharges), while leaving sellers to set their final prices. List prices are …

The paper analyzes the impact of price caps agreed upon by industry participants. Price
caps, like mergers, allow firms to solve Cournot's multiple-marginalization problem, but …

We consider vertical contracts in which the retail market may involve search frictions.
Minimum-advertised-price (MAP) restrictions act as a restraint on customers' information and …

We examine allegations that firms in Alberta's electricity industry manipulated public
information to coordinate in the wholesale market. We investigate whether bids by firms who …

Cartels and bidding rings are often facilitated by intermediaries, who recommend prices/bids
to firms and can impose penalties (such as reverting to competitive behavior in future …

Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or
sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other …