Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions
closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore …

To maximize aggregate effort, a principal allocates agents to a given graph of roles where
each agent's reward is exogenously fixed and increases in the aggregate effort of their …

Farsighted economic agents can use their advantage to exploit their more myopic
counterparts. In public goods games played on networks, such an agent will attempt to …

We study a networked society where public good provision and access are both local and
where selfish agents co-habit with others who follow Kantian imperatives. We find that the …

We study properties of collective action problems bounded by minimal contributions as well
as endowment and variable contributions are neighbourhood dependent. We relate …

This paper models interactions of firms in a pre-trading (fixed network of lending/borrowing)
period whereby firms set fixed lending rates given loan management cost. We show …

We study properties of collective action problems bounded by minimal contributions as well
as endowment and variable contributions are neighbourhood dependent. We relate …

We explore interactions of firms in a pre-trading (fixed network of lending/borrowing) period
whereby firms set fixed lending rates given quadratic loan management costs. Equilibrium …

Abstract Chapter 1: Default and Punishment with Systemic Risk This essay identifies
substituting behaviors in an ex-ante financial system with cyclical default/feedback leading …