Over the last two decades, executive compensation research has focused primarily on
equity-based pay and incentives emanating from executives' firm-specific equity portfolios …

This paper aims to find an answer to the questions of “whether chief executive officers
(CEOs) are compensated for market risk”, and “how the combined interaction of board size …

We examine the impact of compensation-related comment letters (hereafter CCLs) issued by
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) on excess chief executive …

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine whether chief executive officer (CEOs) are
paid for the systematic and/or unsystematic risks and whether there is any optimum risk …

This study examines the impact of long-term trend of CEO pay structure on CEO pay for luck
and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay over a 72-year period from 1949 to 2020. We …

Purpose This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and
CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is …

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by
the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation …

Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation
Page 1 Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive …

In this study, we fill the void in the literature by examining relative CEO to employee pay for
luck and pay asymmetry phenomena over 72 years from 1949 to 2020. We find that CEO …

It is well-known that luck increases the compensation of CEOs at their current firm. In this
paper, we explore how luck affects CEOs' outside options in the labor market, and the …