We study the market for CEOs of large publicly-traded US firms, analyze new CEOs' prior
connections to the hiring firm, and explore how hiring choices are determined. Firms are …

Identifying executives' industry affiliation with categorical membership, this study examines
how moving to a different industry impacts mobility-compensation outcomes. On the demand …

Do social networks help firms recruit talented managers? In our setting, firms are randomly
connected to prospective young managers through former employees. Under a discrete …

Most research on the CEO labor market has studied public company CEOs while largely
ignoring the market for CEOs in private equity funded companies. We fill this gap by studying …

This paper examines the impact of managerial labor market competition on executive
incentive contracts. I develop a dynamic contracting model that incorporates moral hazard …

This paper formulates a dynamic agency framework to explore optimal managerial authority
and compensation over a manager's career in a firm: Initially, authority is assigned …

We document that CEO succession plans reduce the losses associated with CEO turnovers
and provide a more accurate initial assessment of successors, especially when insiders are …

We develop a two-sided multidimensional matching model of the market for CEOs that
allows for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary (amenity) compensation. The model is …

Existing research shows that luck increases CEOs' pay at their current firm. In this work, we
explore how luck affects:(1) CEOs' employment opportunities and (2) the performance of …

It is well-known that luck increases the compensation of CEOs at their current firm. In this
paper, we explore how luck affects CEOs' outside options in the labor market, and the …