Allocation and matching in kidney exchange programs

K Glorie, B Haase‐Kromwijk… - Transplant …, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
Living donor kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for patients suffering from end‐
stage renal disease. To alleviate the shortage of kidney donors, many advances have been …

Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values

R Freedman, JS Borg, W Sinnott-Armstrong… - Artificial Intelligence, 2020 - Elsevier
The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and
computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney …

Failure-aware kidney exchange

JP Dickerson, AD Procaccia, T Sandholm - Proceedings of the fourteenth …, 2013 - dl.acm.org
Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant.
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …

Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem

R Anderson, I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik… - Proceedings of the …, 2015 - National Acad Sciences
As of May 2014 there were more than 100,000 patients on the waiting list for a kidney
transplant from a deceased donor. Although the preferred treatment is a kidney transplant …

An invitation to market design

SD Kominers, A Teytelboym… - Oxford Review of …, 2017 - academic.oup.com
Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to
real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the …

Position-indexed formulations for kidney exchange

JP Dickerson, DF Manlove, B Plaut… - Proceedings of the …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need of a kidney swap
willing but incompatible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically …

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange

I Ashlagi, AE Roth - Theoretical Economics, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
As multi‐hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients
and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard‐to‐match …

Kidney exchange: An operations perspective

I Ashlagi, AE Roth - Management Science, 2021 - pubsonline.informs.org
Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …

Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets

SM Lee - The Review of Economic Studies, 2016 - academic.oup.com
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to
manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which …

Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Algorithms and experimentation

DF Manlove, G O'malley - Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA), 2015 - dl.acm.org
We study the computational problem of identifying optimal sets of kidney exchanges in the
UK. We show how to expand an integer programming-based formulation due to Roth et …