Allocation and matching in kidney exchange programs
K Glorie, B Haase‐Kromwijk… - Transplant …, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
Living donor kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for patients suffering from end‐
stage renal disease. To alleviate the shortage of kidney donors, many advances have been …
stage renal disease. To alleviate the shortage of kidney donors, many advances have been …
Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values
The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and
computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney …
computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney …
Failure-aware kidney exchange
Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant.
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …
Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem
As of May 2014 there were more than 100,000 patients on the waiting list for a kidney
transplant from a deceased donor. Although the preferred treatment is a kidney transplant …
transplant from a deceased donor. Although the preferred treatment is a kidney transplant …
An invitation to market design
SD Kominers, A Teytelboym… - Oxford Review of …, 2017 - academic.oup.com
Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to
real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the …
real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the …
Position-indexed formulations for kidney exchange
A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need of a kidney swap
willing but incompatible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically …
willing but incompatible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically …
Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange
As multi‐hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients
and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard‐to‐match …
and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard‐to‐match …
Kidney exchange: An operations perspective
Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …
Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
SM Lee - The Review of Economic Studies, 2016 - academic.oup.com
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to
manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which …
manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which …
Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Algorithms and experimentation
DF Manlove, G O'malley - Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA), 2015 - dl.acm.org
We study the computational problem of identifying optimal sets of kidney exchanges in the
UK. We show how to expand an integer programming-based formulation due to Roth et …
UK. We show how to expand an integer programming-based formulation due to Roth et …