We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …

Over the past decade, an exciting connection has developed between the theory of posted-
price mechanisms and the prophet inequality, a result from the theory of optimal stopping …

This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central
problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in …

We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in
multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of bidder valuations including unit-demand …

In decentralized finance (" DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to
programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets …

Designing an incentive-compatible auction mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's
revenue while minimizes the bidders' ex-post regret is an important yet intricate problem in …

We study the sample complexity of learning revenue-optimal multi-item auctions. We obtain
the first set of positive results that go beyond the standard but unrealistic setting of item …

The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, ie multi item auctions over
bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics …