Lately, there has been an increase in the use of sequential mechanisms, instead of the
traditional direct counterparts, in college admissions in many countries, including Germany …

We investigate sequential two-stage admission systems with public and private schools. A
sequential notion of truthfulness, called straightforwardness, is introduced. Contrary to one …

We analyze sequential preference submission in centralized matching problems such as
school choice. Our motivation is school districts and colleges that use an application website …

This paper studies a decentralized college admissions game with single application
motivated by college admissions in many countries such as Japan, Russia, South Korea and …

For a long time, the monopoly of military enterprises in defense acquisition projects (DAPs)
has limited the participation of many civilian enterprises. It results in a lack of innovation and …

We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to
agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage …

We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect
information induced by the firm-oriented deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm in a one-to-one …

Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching
markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the …

We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms through which hospitals make
simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. The inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of …

We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms in which hospitals make
simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. We prove that all pure strategy subgame …