A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
I Okada - Games, 2020 - mdpi.com
Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the
publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed …
publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed …
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with group
interests,,,,,–. According to the 'tragedy of the commons', these misalignments can lead to …
interests,,,,,–. According to the 'tragedy of the commons', these misalignments can lead to …
Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
W Sun, L Liu, X Chen, A Szolnoki, VV Vasconcelos - Iscience, 2021 - cell.com
Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in
risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both …
risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both …
Facilitating the evolution of cooperation through altruistic punishment with adaptive feedback
S Hua, L Liu - Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2023 - Elsevier
The stability and persistence of cooperation are often threatened by the selfish behavior of
self-interested individuals. One possible solution to this problem is to punish self-interested …
self-interested individuals. One possible solution to this problem is to punish self-interested …
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
L Liu, Z Xiao, X Chen… - Journal of the Royal …, 2022 - royalsocietypublishing.org
Explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals from
an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy and social …
an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy and social …
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
L Liu, X Chen, A Szolnoki - Mathematical Models and Methods in …, 2019 - World Scientific
Pro-social punishment is a key driver of harmonious and stable society. However, this
institution is vulnerable to corruption since law-violators can avoid sanctioning by paying …
institution is vulnerable to corruption since law-violators can avoid sanctioning by paying …
Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
L Liu, S Wang, X Chen, M Perc - Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of …, 2018 - pubs.aip.org
Pro-social punishment and exclusion are common means to elevate the level of cooperation
among unrelated individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these …
among unrelated individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these …
Effect of reputation-based heterogeneous investment on cooperation in spatial public goods game
X Ma, J Quan, X Wang - Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2021 - Elsevier
Cooperation that emerges in the situation of multi-person social dilemma has attracted
intensive interest and been analyzed under the widely used public goods game (PGG) …
intensive interest and been analyzed under the widely used public goods game (PGG) …
Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding
People routinely cooperate with each other, even when cooperation is costly. To further
encourage such pro-social behaviors, recipients often respond by providing additional …
encourage such pro-social behaviors, recipients often respond by providing additional …