Poverty traps

C Azariadis, J Stachurski - Handbook of economic growth, 2005 - Elsevier
This survey reviews models of self-reinforcing mechanisms that cause poverty to persist.
Some of them examine market failure in environments where the neoclassical assumptions …

Agent-based models and human subject experiments

J Duffy - Handbook of computational economics, 2006 - Elsevier
This chapter examines the relationship between agent-based modeling and economic
decision-making experiments with human subjects. Both approaches exploit controlled …

[图书][B] Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction

CF Camerer - 2011 - books.google.com
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how
emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people …

The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence

P Dal Bó, GR Fréchette - American Economic Review, 2011 - aeaweb.org
A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp
predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present …

[图书][B] Nonlinear oligopolies

Oligopoly theory is one of the most intensively studied areas of mathematical economics. On
the basis of the pioneering works of Cournot (1838), many researchers have developed and …

When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

G Devetag, A Ortmann - Experimental economics, 2007 - Springer
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major attention over the
past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely …

The power of focal points is limited: Even minute payoff asymmetry may yield large coordination failures

VP Crawford, U Gneezy, Y Rottenstreich - American Economic Review, 2008 - aeaweb.org
Since Schelling, it has often been assumed that players make use of salient decision labels
to achieve coordination. Consistent with previous work, we find that given equal payoffs …

Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games

R Battalio, L Samuelson, J Van Huyck - Econometrica, 2001 - JSTOR
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE FEASIBLE strategies and preferences that define a strategic-
form game, together with the assumption that players are substantively rational, provides a …

[图书][B] Reflexion and control: mathematical models

DA Novikov, AG Chkhartishvili - 2014 - books.google.com
This book is dedicated to modern approaches to mathematical modeling of reflexive
processes in control. The authors consider reflexive games that describe the …

Learning and the economics of small decisions

I Erev, E Haruvy - The handbook of experimental economics, 2013 - degruyter.com
Mainstream analysis of economic behavior assumes that economic incentives can shape
behavior even when individual agents have limited understanding of the environment (see …