[PDF][PDF] Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods.

S Bouveret, Y Chevaleyre, N Maudet, H Moulin - 2016 - Citeseer
As introduced in Chapter 11 (Thomson, 2015), Fair Division refers to the general problem of
fairly dividing a common resource among agents having different—and sometimes …

Hedonic games

H Aziz, R Savani - 2016 - livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk
Introduction Coalitions are a central part of economic, political, and social life, and coalition
formation has been studied extensively within the mathematical social sciences. Agents (be …

[HTML][HTML] Social choice theory

C List - 2013 - plato.stanford.edu
Social choice theory is the study of collective decision procedures and mechanisms. It is not
a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual …

Applications of matching models under preferences

P Biró - 2017 - books.google.com
Matching problems under preferences have been studied widely in mathematics, computer
science and economics, starting with the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962). A …

[图书][B] Economics and computation

J Rothe - 2015 - Springer
1 Her work has been supported in part by an NRW grant for gender-sensitive universities
supporting her as a junior professor for Computational Social Choice and by the project …

The conference paper assignment problem: Using order weighted averages to assign indivisible goods

JW Lian, N Mattei, R Noble, T Walsh - proceedings of the AAAI …, 2018 - ojs.aaai.org
We propose a novel mechanism for solving the assignment problem when we have a two
sided matching problem with preferences from one side (the agents/reviewers) over the …

On fair division under heterogeneous matroid constraints

A Dror, M Feldman, E Segal-Halevi - Journal of Artificial Intelligence …, 2023 - jair.org
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among additive agents with feasibility
constraints. In these settings, every agent is restricted to get a bundle among a specified set …

Object allocation via swaps along a social network

L Gourvès, J Lesca, A Wilczynski - 26th International Joint Conference …, 2017 - hal.science
This article deals with object allocation where each agent receives a single item. Starting
from an initial endowment, the agents can be better off by exchanging their objects …

Stable marriage with multi-modal preferences

J Chen, R Niedermeier, P Skowron - … of the 2018 ACM Conference on …, 2018 - dl.acm.org
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now
based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank …

[PDF][PDF] Stability and Pareto optimality in refugee allocation matchings

H Aziz, J Chen, S Gaspers, Z Sun - Proceedings of the 17th International …, 2018 - ifaamas.org
Centralized matching markets based on the preferences of the concerned agents have been
one of the successful stories of algorithmic economics. These approaches have been …