Political competition, party polarization, and government performance
RJ Sørensen - Public Choice, 2014 - Springer
Lack of party competition may impair government efficiency. If the voters are ideologically
predisposed to cast their votes in favor of one political party, they may reelect an …
predisposed to cast their votes in favor of one political party, they may reelect an …
Partisan bias, electoral volatility, and government efficiency
L Helland, RJ Sørensen - Electoral Studies, 2015 - Elsevier
Electoral agency models suggest that government efficiency improves when voters penalize
poor performance, and party competition is balanced. Uncertainty in the electoral …
poor performance, and party competition is balanced. Uncertainty in the electoral …
[图书][B] Contemporary political agency
B Maiguashca, R Marchetti - 2014 - api.taylorfrancis.com
This book explores and critically reflects upon the theory and practice of political agency in
contemporary global politics. In light of the changing relationship between state, market and …
contemporary global politics. In light of the changing relationship between state, market and …
[PDF][PDF] Rent-seeking behaviour in local government budget in Indonesia
PH Adi - 2018 - vuir.vu.edu.au
Prior studies on government budget expenditure and its impact on government performance
have demonstrated mixed results. Improper or inappropriate budget allocations can lead to …
have demonstrated mixed results. Improper or inappropriate budget allocations can lead to …
Voting, taxes, and heterogeneous preferences: Evidence from Swedish local elections
In this paper, we investigate whether voters' reactions to tax changes depend on their
preferences for public spending, in order to increase our understanding of the relationship …
preferences for public spending, in order to increase our understanding of the relationship …
Private agenda and re-election incentives
J Rivas - Social Choice and Welfare, 2016 - Springer
Consider a politician who has to take two sequential decisions during his term in office. For
each decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the …
each decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the …
Electoral agency in the lab: Learning to throw out the rascals
L Helland, L Monkerud - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2013 - journals.sagepub.com
Models of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selection that voters can
achieve in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief formation and …
achieve in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief formation and …
[PDF][PDF] Private Agenda and Re-election Incentives
J Rivas - 2013 - researchportal.bath.ac.uk
Consider a politician who has to take several decisions during his term in office. For each
decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the right …
decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the right …
Political agency in the economy: Cooperatives, solidarity and territory in Euskadi and Aquitaine 1
X Itçaina - Contemporary Political Agency, 2013 - api.taylorfrancis.com
In the present global economic crisis, the 'social economy'–ie those forms of economic
organization located between the public sector and the private for-profit sector–has aroused …
organization located between the public sector and the private for-profit sector–has aroused …
Biased competition, popularity shocks, and government inefficiency
L Helland, RJ Sørensen - Popularity Shocks, and Government …, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
We present an electoral agency model that, in a stylized way, captures the public finance
structure of Norwegian municipal governments. It drives the following main implication …
structure of Norwegian municipal governments. It drives the following main implication …