We study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises
and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty …

This article applies mechanism design to the study of international conflict resolution.
Standard mechanisms in which an arbitrator can enforce her decisions are usually not …

Wars impose tremendous costs on societies and the question of how to end them is of
foremost importance. Several hundred books and scientific articles have been written on …

Would perfectly rational agents always negotiate peaceful out& comes at the bargaining
table, or would they sometimes fight costly wars? The Coase theorem suggests that when …

Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punishment” for entering into a
dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment …

Authoritarian regimes adopt ostensibly democratic institutions for undemocratic purposes.
Existing research emphasizes five different functions of elections under authoritarianism …

We investigate how the structure of the international bargaining process affects the
resolution of crises. Despite the vast diversity in bargaining protocols, we find that there is a …

This article examines why rebel groups make large demands of governments that are
inconsistent with their fighting capacity, especially when such demands are almost always …

The energy transition increases the demand for minerals from ethnically diverse, conflict-
prone developing countries. We study whether and where mining is possible in such …

Formal models commonly characterize interstate bargaining as dichotomous, ending in
either war or peace. But there are many forms of coercion—including supporting rebel …