Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts

J Watson - Annual Review of Economics, 2021 - annualreviews.org
This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term
contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and …

Firm innovation and covenant tightness

Z Ma, KE Novoselov, D Stice, Y Zhang - Review of Accounting Studies, 2024 - Springer
This study explores the association between firm innovation and loan covenant strictness.
We find that lenders construct stricter contracts for firms filing more patents, consistent with …

Why do people who belong to the same clan engage in the same entrepreneurial activities?—a case study on the influence of clan networks on the content of farmers' …

X Jiang, X Ma, Z Li, Y Guo, A Xu, X Su - Frontiers in Psychology, 2022 - frontiersin.org
Farmers' entrepreneurship is a powerful breakthrough for solving the problems associated
with “agriculture, rural areas and farmers.” Although studies have commonly used the same …

Reselling information

SN Ali, A Chen-Zion, E Lillethun - Games and Economic Behavior, 2024 - Elsevier
Abstract Information can be simultaneously consumed, replicated, and sold to others. We
study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. Even if the initial seller is an …

The use and misuse of coordinated punishments

D Barron, Y Guo - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2021 - academic.oup.com
Communication facilitates cooperation by ensuring that deviators are collectively punished.
We explore how players might misuse communication to threaten one another, and we …

Relational contracts: Reputation and renegotiation

DG Pearce, E Stacchetti - Journal of Institutional and …, 2023 - search.proquest.com
This paper outlines some thoughts on relational contracts. Such a contract can involve an
implicit agreement to behave in certain ways, that includes the use of explicit, legally …

Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting

D Cetemen, FZ Feng, C Urgun - Journal of Economic Theory, 2023 - Elsevier
This paper studies a continuous-time, finite-horizon contracting problem with renegotiation
and dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting. The problem is …

[图书][B] Institutional and organizational economics: a behavioral game theory introduction

T Ellingsen - 2023 - books.google.com
Why do some countries succeed while others struggle? Why are some firms profitable while
rivals fail? Why do some marriages thrive and others end in divorce? These questions seem …

Balanced scorecards: A relational contract approach

O Kvaløy, TE Olsen - Journal of accounting research, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
Reward systems based on balanced scorecards often connect pay to an index, that is, a
weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may …

Past and future developments in the economics of relational contracts

M Fahn, WB MacLeod, G Muehlheusser - 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper was written as an editorial preface to a" Symposium on Relational Contracts",
that was jointly edited by the three authors, and that will appear in the Journal of Institutional …