A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to
each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min …

This paper introduces a model of preferences, in which, given beliefs about uncertain
outcomes, an individual evaluates an action by a quantile of the induced distribution. The …

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the
state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full …

This paper characterizes generic equilibrium play in a multi-sender version of Crawford and
Sobel's (1982) cheap talk model, when robustness to a broad class of beliefs about noise in …

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An
uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of …

Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies.
We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information …

We consider a general model of arbitration. The outcome following failed settlement is
endogenous and depends on the arbitration mechanism. We show that the arbitration …

This paper shows that in multi-sender cheap talk games, if the state space is large enough,
then there exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state that are robust to …

I study how an unbiased and uninformed decision maker should design a mechanism that
provides enough incentives for possibly biased agents to share their information impartially …

This paper realizes a preliminary theoretical analysis concerning the correlation between
the execution of a liability action and the increase of potential negative effects from a …