Publisher Summary This chapter discusses cooperative models of bargaining. The
axiomatic theory of bargaining originated in a fundamental paper by JF Nash. Nash …

We introduce an ordinal model of efficiency measurement. Our primitive is a notion of
efficiency that is comparative, but not cardinal or absolute. In this framework, we postulate …

This volume is an independent companion to Small Group Research: Basic Issues
(Blumberg et al. 2009). Together the two volumes attempt to provide thorough coverage of …

Whenever a company implements a group-based incentive plan for the first time, free-riding
may destroy trust among employees and harm performance. We propose a static model to …

Gupta and Livne (1988) modified Nash's (1950) original bargaining problem through the
introduction of a reference point restricted to lie in the bargaining set. Additionally, they …

Uncertainty with respect to the feasible set of utility vectors is introduced in an axiomatic
bargaining model. Given a criterion for nonprobabilistic decision-making under uncertainty …

Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that there are several possible
states of nature, each of which is identified with a bargaining problem. We characterize …

Global bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues are formalized as
cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we …

In this paper we address two-person bargaining problems under uncertainty where several
states of nature or future scenarios are considered. We propose a solution concept based on …

We study a bargaining model where (i) players' interim disagreement payoffs are stochastic
and (ii) in any period, the proposer may postpone making an offer without losing the right to …