A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

E Dechenaux, D Kovenock, RM Sheremeta - Experimental Economics, 2015 - Springer
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which
agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These …

Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments

RM Sheremeta - A Collection of Surveys on Market …, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
We provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main
phenomena observed in most contest experiments:(i) overbidding relative to the standard …

A reconsideration of gender differences in risk attitudes

A Filippin, P Crosetto - Management Science, 2016 - pubsonline.informs.org
This paper reconsiders the wide agreement that females are more risk averse than males.
We survey the existing experimental literature, finding that significance and magnitude of …

Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests

RM Sheremeta - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its
performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest …

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

EO Kimbrough, K Laughren, R Sheremeta - Journal of Economic Behavior …, 2020 - Elsevier
We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but
their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a …

Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study

TN Cason, WA Masters, RM Sheremeta - Journal of Public Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-
all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which …

Facing your opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests

SD Mago, AC Samak… - Journal of Conflict …, 2016 - journals.sagepub.com
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on
individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find significant overexpenditure of effort …

[HTML][HTML] Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

SM Chowdhury, RM Sheremeta, TL Turocy - Games and Economic …, 2014 - Elsevier
We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the
performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and …

Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum

SD Mago, RM Sheremeta, A Yates - International Journal of Industrial …, 2013 - Elsevier
We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest. Intermediate prizes
lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower …

A generalized Tullock contest

SM Chowdhury, RM Sheremeta - Public Choice, 2011 - Springer
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent
upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the …