Marketplaces, markets, and market design
AE Roth - American Economic Review, 2018 - aeaweb.org
Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …
[PDF][PDF] Implementing the wisdom of waze
S Vasserman, M Feldman… - … -Fourth International Joint …, 2015 - scholar.harvard.edu
We study a setting of non-atomic routing in a network of m parallel links with asymmetry of
information. While a central entity (such as a GPS navigation system)—a mediator hereafter …
information. While a central entity (such as a GPS navigation system)—a mediator hereafter …
Competitive search
O Kurland, M Tennenholtz - Proceedings of the 45th International ACM …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
The Web is a canonical example of a competitive search setting that includes document
authors with ranking incentives: their goal is to promote their documents in rankings induced …
authors with ranking incentives: their goal is to promote their documents in rankings induced …
Strong mediated equilibrium
D Monderer, M Tennenholtz - Artificial Intelligence, 2009 - Elsevier
Stability against potential deviations by sets of agents is a most desired property in the
design and analysis of multi-agent systems. However, unfortunately, this property is typically …
design and analysis of multi-agent systems. However, unfortunately, this property is typically …
Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
F Decarolis, M Goldmanis, A Penta - Management Science, 2020 - pubsonline.informs.org
The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a
proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to …
proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to …
Privacy and truthful equilibrium selection for aggregative games
We study a very general class of games—multi-dimensional aggregative games—which in
particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any …
particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any …
Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games
Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable.
However, large n player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete …
However, large n player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete …
A game theoretic analysis of the adversarial retrieval setting
The main goal of search engines is ad hoc retrieval: ranking documents in a corpus by their
relevance to the information need expressed by a query. The Probability Ranking Principle …
relevance to the information need expressed by a query. The Probability Ranking Principle …
On the value of correlation
Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Correlated
equilibrium captures the idea that in many systems there exists a trusted administrator who …
equilibrium captures the idea that in many systems there exists a trusted administrator who …
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
DRM Thompson, K Leyton-Brown - … of the 10th ACM conference on …, 2009 - dl.acm.org
Position auctions were widely used by search engines to sell keyword advertising before
being well understood (and, indeed, studied) theoretically. To date, theorists have made …
being well understood (and, indeed, studied) theoretically. To date, theorists have made …