Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy

D Christensen - Philosophy Compass, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others–
perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well‐qualified as you are–hold beliefs contrary to …

[图书][B] Disagreement

B Frances - 2014 - books.google.com
Regardless of who you are or how you live your life, you disagree with millions of people on
an enormous number of topics from politics, religion and morality to sport, culture and art …

[图书][B] The epistemic significance of disagreement

J Matheson - 2015 - books.google.com
Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of
epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees …

[图书][B] Regard for reason in the moral mind

J May - 2018 - books.google.com
The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral
thought and action, we're told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately …

Not just a truthometer: Taking oneself seriously (but not too seriously) in cases of peer disagreement

D Enoch - Mind, 2010 - academic.oup.com
How should you update your (degrees of) belief about a proposition when you find out that
someone else—as reliable as you are in these matters—disagrees with you about its truth …

[图书][B] Knowing right from wrong

K Setiya - 2012 - books.google.com
Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there
is reason to do? The thought that we can is beset by sceptical problems. In the face of …

Epistemic modesty defended

D Christensen - 2013 - philpapers.org
It has often been noticed that conciliatory views of disagreement are" self-undermining" in a
certain way: advocates of such views cannot consistently maintain them when other …

Reflective equilibrium

Y Cath - The Oxford handbook of philosophical methodology, 2016 - books.google.com
The method of reflective equilibrium is a method for figuring out what to believe about some
target domain of philosophical interest like, say, justice, morality, or knowledge. This method …

Epistemic Autonomy and Intellectual Humility: mutually supporting virtues

J Matheson - Social Epistemology, 2024 - Taylor & Francis
Recently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of
epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related …

Disagreement and epistemic peers

J Matheson - 2014 - academic.oup.com
This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the
following questions:(1) How does discovering that an epistemic equal disagrees with you …