Bounding the estimation error of sampling-based Shapley value approximation
The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative
game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be" fairly" …
game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be" fairly" …
A review of cooperative rules and their associated algorithms for minimum-cost spanning tree problems
G Bergantiños, J Vidal-Puga - SERIEs, 2021 - Springer
Minimum-cost spanning tree problems are well-known problems in the operations research
literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by …
literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by …
Addressing the computational issues of the Shapley value with applications in the smart grid
S Maleki - 2015 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
We consider the computational issues that arise in using the Shapley value in practical
applications. Calculating the Shapley value involves computing the value of an exponential …
applications. Calculating the Shapley value involves computing the value of an exponential …
A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems
C Trudeau - Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 - Elsevier
Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems try to connect agents efficiently to a source
when agents are located at different points in space and the cost of using an edge is fixed …
when agents are located at different points in space and the cost of using an edge is fixed …
Efficient computation of the Shapley value for large-scale linear production games
PH Le, TD Nguyen, T Bektaş - Annals of Operations Research, 2020 - Springer
The linear production game is concerned with allocating the total payoff of an enterprise
among the owners of the resources in a fair way. With cooperative game theory providing a …
among the owners of the resources in a fair way. With cooperative game theory providing a …
Lipschitz Continuous Allocations for Optimization Games
S Kumabe, Y Yoshida - arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.11889, 2024 - arxiv.org
In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs
among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately …
among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately …
Linearly representable games and pseudo-polynomial calculation of the Shapley value
F Illés - arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.12324, 2022 - arxiv.org
We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU
games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like …
games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like …
On the structure of synergies in cooperative games
A Procaccia, N Shah, M Tucker - … of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2014 - ojs.aaai.org
We investigate synergy, or lack thereof, between agents in cooperative games, building on
the popular notion of Shapley value. We think of a pair of agents as synergistic (resp …
the popular notion of Shapley value. We think of a pair of agents as synergistic (resp …
[引用][C] Handbook of the Shapley value
Computing Shapley values in the plane
We consider the problem of computing Shapley values for points in the plane, where each
point is interpreted as a player, and the value of a coalition is defined by the area or the …
point is interpreted as a player, and the value of a coalition is defined by the area or the …