Situated approaches to cognition maintain that cognition is embodied, embedded, enactive,
and affective (and extended, but that is not relevant here). Situated approaches are often …

When we look around us, some things look “alive,” others do not. What is it to “look alive”—to
perceive animacy? Empirical work supports the view that animacy is genuinely perceptual …

" This book provides a framework for thinking about foundational philosophical questions
surrounding machine learning as an approach to artificial intelligence. Specifically, it links …

Knowledge is a naturally attractive state. As Aristotle saw it,“all men by nature desire to
know”(Metaphysics A 1, 980a21), but men are not alone in this. Curiosity, still characterized …

The predominance of machine learning based techniques in cognitive neuroscience raises
a host of philosophical and methodological concerns. Given the messiness of neural activity …

We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing
how and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that P is knowing how to …

This paper presents an argument for the realism about mechanisms, contents, and vehicles
of mental representation at both the personal and subpersonal levels, and showcases its …

This paper investigates confabulations in Korsakoff's syndrome (KS) from the perspective of
error-based teleosemantics, a framework that emphasizes the role of error detection in …

Nonhuman animals have long been seen as a crucial source of evidence regarding the
nature and origins of human social capacities, such as communication, deception, culture …

I argue that at least some nonlinguistic animals have conceptual capabilities. First, I show
that positions that take linguistic capabilities to be necessary for conceptual capabilities are …