Let the worst one fail: a credible solution to the too-big-to-fail conundrum

T Philippon, O Wang - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2023 - academic.oup.com
We study time-consistent bank resolution mechanisms. The key constraint is that
governments cannot avoid bailouts that are ex post efficient. Contrary to common wisdom …

Too Domestic to Fail: Liquidity Provision and National Champions

E Farhi, J Tirole - Review of Economic Studies, 2024 - academic.oup.com
Authorities' support policies shape the location and continuation of industrial and banking
activity on their soil. Firms' locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial …

Multinational banks and financial stability

C Clayton, A Schaab - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2022 - academic.oup.com
We study the scope for international cooperation in macroprudential policies. Multinational
banks contribute to and are affected by fire sales in countries they operate in. National …

Financial restructuring and resolution of banks

JE Colliard, D Gromb - HEC Paris Research Paper No. FIN-2018 …, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
How do resolution frameworks affect the private restructuring of distressed banks? We
model a distressed bank's shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring given …

Optimal policy for behavioral financial crises

P Fontanier - Available at SSRN 4282972, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
Should policymakers adapt their macroprudential and monetary policies when the financial
sector is vulnerable to belief-driven boom-bust cycles? I develop a model in which financial …

[PDF][PDF] Bank bailouts, bail-ins, or no regulatory intervention? A dynamic model and empirical tests of optimal regulation

AN Berger, CP Himmelberg, RA Roman… - Available at SSRN …, 2018 - efmaefm.org
We develop a dynamic model of optimal regulatory design of three regimes that deal with
distress of large, complex banking organizations. These regimes are 1) bailout, as under …

Bank bailouts, bail‐ins, or no regulatory intervention? A dynamic model and empirical tests of optimal regulation and implications for future crises

AN Berger, CP Himmelberg, RA Roman… - Financial …, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
We model dynamic bank capital structure under three optimally‐designed regulatory
regimes for dealing with potential default—bailout, in which the government provides capital; …

The carrot and the stick: Bank bailouts and the disciplining role of board appointments

C Mücke, L Pelizzon, V Pezone… - … Journal: Economic Policy, 2024 - pubs.aeaweb.org
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to
bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence …

Do repeated government infusions help financial stability? Evidence from an emerging market

M Kalimipalli, O Morohunfolu… - Journal of Financial …, 2024 - Elsevier
While government led bank capital infusions in US and other developed markets have been
usually contingent an external shock or crisis episode, India presents a unique setting where …

[PDF][PDF] Crisis interventions in corporate insolvency

S Antill, C Clayton - Available at SSRN 3779631, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium.
Collateralconstrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) …