Let the worst one fail: a credible solution to the too-big-to-fail conundrum
T Philippon, O Wang - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2023 - academic.oup.com
We study time-consistent bank resolution mechanisms. The key constraint is that
governments cannot avoid bailouts that are ex post efficient. Contrary to common wisdom …
governments cannot avoid bailouts that are ex post efficient. Contrary to common wisdom …
Too Domestic to Fail: Liquidity Provision and National Champions
E Farhi, J Tirole - Review of Economic Studies, 2024 - academic.oup.com
Authorities' support policies shape the location and continuation of industrial and banking
activity on their soil. Firms' locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial …
activity on their soil. Firms' locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial …
Multinational banks and financial stability
We study the scope for international cooperation in macroprudential policies. Multinational
banks contribute to and are affected by fire sales in countries they operate in. National …
banks contribute to and are affected by fire sales in countries they operate in. National …
Financial restructuring and resolution of banks
JE Colliard, D Gromb - HEC Paris Research Paper No. FIN-2018 …, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
How do resolution frameworks affect the private restructuring of distressed banks? We
model a distressed bank's shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring given …
model a distressed bank's shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring given …
Optimal policy for behavioral financial crises
P Fontanier - Available at SSRN 4282972, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
Should policymakers adapt their macroprudential and monetary policies when the financial
sector is vulnerable to belief-driven boom-bust cycles? I develop a model in which financial …
sector is vulnerable to belief-driven boom-bust cycles? I develop a model in which financial …
[PDF][PDF] Bank bailouts, bail-ins, or no regulatory intervention? A dynamic model and empirical tests of optimal regulation
We develop a dynamic model of optimal regulatory design of three regimes that deal with
distress of large, complex banking organizations. These regimes are 1) bailout, as under …
distress of large, complex banking organizations. These regimes are 1) bailout, as under …
Bank bailouts, bail‐ins, or no regulatory intervention? A dynamic model and empirical tests of optimal regulation and implications for future crises
We model dynamic bank capital structure under three optimally‐designed regulatory
regimes for dealing with potential default—bailout, in which the government provides capital; …
regimes for dealing with potential default—bailout, in which the government provides capital; …
The carrot and the stick: Bank bailouts and the disciplining role of board appointments
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to
bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence …
bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence …
Do repeated government infusions help financial stability? Evidence from an emerging market
M Kalimipalli, O Morohunfolu… - Journal of Financial …, 2024 - Elsevier
While government led bank capital infusions in US and other developed markets have been
usually contingent an external shock or crisis episode, India presents a unique setting where …
usually contingent an external shock or crisis episode, India presents a unique setting where …
[PDF][PDF] Crisis interventions in corporate insolvency
We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium.
Collateralconstrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) …
Collateralconstrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) …