“潮涌现象”与产能过剩的形成机制 Page 1 1 No. C2009011 2009-12 “潮涌现象”与产能过剩的
形成机制 ∗ 林毅夫巫和懋邢亦青 No. C2009011 2009 年12 月25 日 摘要:全球金融风暴之后,产能 …

We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The
organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users …

Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas
Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction …

The game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative
framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of …

We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent
probability 0 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and …

Auctions are widely used in practice. Although auctions are also extensively studied in the
literature, most of the developments rely on the significant common prior assumption. We …

Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal
(crowdsourcer) desires to solicit a maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) …

This paper develops a payoff equivalence theorem for mechanisms with ambiguity averse
participants with preferences of the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) form (Gilboa and …

In winner‐take‐all tournaments, agents' performance is determined jointly by effort and luck,
and the top performer is rewarded. We study the impact of the “shape of luck”—the details of …

We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on
equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player's strategy is optimal at …