We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We
classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages …

Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate the impact of the
adoption of a cleaner technology (ie, a decrease in the emission to output ratio). We show …

We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where, in addition to the standard
temporal dimension, a spatial dimension is introduced to capture the geographical …

It is known that an eco-efficiency strategy, which saves resources in the production process,
may be offset by a rebound effect; it may even backfire. Less known are the exact conditions …

We study the dynamics of equilibrium participation in an international environmental
agreement aimed at increasing the stock of a global public good such as climate change …

We analyze a dynamic model of international environmental agreements where countries
cannot make long-term commitments or use sanctions or rewards to induce cooperation …

The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of
“green” technologies. Using a simple model, we highlight a conflict between international …

We develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of patent policies and emission
taxes on green innovation that reduces the emission-output ratio, and on the emission level …

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an
alternative to international cooperation on greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. In …

Global cooperation with respect to greenhouse gas emissions mitigation is contingent on
finding common ground in addressing the problem of adaptation to climate change impacts …