Participatory budgeting: Models and approaches

H Aziz, N Shah - Pathways Between Social Science and Computational …, 2021 - Springer
Participatory budgeting is a democratic approach to deciding the funding of public projects,
which has been adopted in many cities across the world. We present a survey of research …

[PDF][PDF] Algorithmic game theory

T Roughgarden - Communications of the ACM, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Algorithmic game theory Page 1 78 communications of the acm | july 2010 | vol. 53 | no. 7 review
articles The widespread adopTioN of the Internet and the emergence of the Web changed …

[PDF][PDF] Algorithmic mechanism design

N Nisan, A Ronen - Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM …, 1999 - dl.acm.org
We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants annot be
assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such pxticipants, termed …

Approximately optimal mechanism design

T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well
as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from …

Differentially private combinatorial optimization

A Gupta, K Ligett, F McSherry, A Roth, K Talwar - Proceedings of the twenty …, 2010 - SIAM
Consider the following problem: given a metric space, some of whose points are “clients,”
select a set of at most k facility locations to minimize the average distance from the clients to …

A budget feasible incentive mechanism for weighted coverage maximization in mobile crowdsensing

Z Zheng, F Wu, X Gao, H Zhu, S Tang… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile crowdsensing is a novel paradigm to collect sensing data and extract useful
information about regions of interest. It widely employs incentive mechanisms to recruit a …

Fast and Private Submodular and -Submodular Functions Maximization with Matroid Constraints

A Rafiey, Y Yoshida - International conference on machine …, 2020 - proceedings.mlr.press
The problem of maximizing nonnegative monotone submodular functions under a certain
constraint has been intensively studied in the last decade, and a wide range of efficient …

Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms

M Babaioff, Y Sharma, A Slivkins - … of the 10th ACM conference on …, 2009 - dl.acm.org
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet
advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is …

On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms

N Chen, N Gravin, P Lu - Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM …, 2011 - SIAM
Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic
mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the …

The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions

NR Devanur, SM Kakade - Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on …, 2009 - dl.acm.org
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-
rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the classic …