Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas
We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas.
Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching …
Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching …
Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
School choice programs are implemented to give students/parents an opportunity to choose
the public school the students attend. Controlled school choice programs need to provide …
the public school the students attend. Controlled school choice programs need to provide …
[HTML][HTML] Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
This paper considers matching problems with individual/regional minimum/maximum
quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of …
quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of …
[HTML][HTML] Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
In this work, we consider a student-project-resource matching-allocation problem, where
students have preferences over projects and the projects have preferences over students. In …
students have preferences over projects and the projects have preferences over students. In …
A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
T Fleiner, N Kamiyama - Mathematics of Operations …, 2016 - pubsonline.informs.org
In 2010, Huang introduced the laminar classified stable matching problem (lcsm for short)
that is motivated by academic hiring. This problem is an extension of the well-known …
that is motivated by academic hiring. This problem is an extension of the well-known …
“Almost-stable” matchings in the Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples
Abstract The Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples (hrc) models the allocation of
intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference …
intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference …
Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms
We consider the problem of computing matchings under two-sided preferences in the
presence of lower as well as upper-quota requirements for the resources. In the presence of …
presence of lower as well as upper-quota requirements for the resources. In the presence of …
Priority-based assignment with reserves and quotas
A Abdulkadiroğlu, A Grigoryan - 2021 - nber.org
We study priority-based assignment problems with distributional and diversity objectives.
Our work provides an axiomatic characterization of a general class of choice rules which are …
Our work provides an axiomatic characterization of a general class of choice rules which are …
Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
Y Yokoi - Algorithmica, 2020 - Springer
While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the
problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an …
problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an …
Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
We generalize the serial dictatorship (SD) and probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism for
assigning indivisible objects (seats in a school) to agents (students) to accommodate …
assigning indivisible objects (seats in a school) to agents (students) to accommodate …