We develop a model with partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage shocks to quantify risk
sharing. Closed-form solutions are obtained for equilibrium allocations and for moments of …

A seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of which she
privately knows. Buyers compete by offering menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the …

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously
limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively …

This paper argues that the large body of research that follows Mirrlees approach to optimal
taxation has been developing in two directions, referred to as the micro and macro …

There is a conventional wisdom in economics that public debt can serve as a substitute for
private credit if private borrowing is limited. The purpose of this paper is to show that, while a …

This paper studies the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environment,
relaxing the assumption of exclusivity of insurance contracts. There are three types of agents …

We analyze the general equilibrium of an economy in which a competitive industry produces
nonexclusive insurance services. The equilibrium is inefficient because insurance contracts …

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial
transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs …

We consider the model common agency proposed by Biais Martimort and Rochet (2000,
2013). We show that in this setting there is no symmetric equilibrium as the one …

This paper studies the role of limited commitment and preference heterogeneity in
explaining the consumption allocation in village economies. I estimate the dynamic contract …