Computational social choice is an expanding field that merges classical topics like
economics and voting theory with more modern topics like artificial intelligence, multiagent …

In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators
jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining …

We investigate the extent to which it is possible to compute the probability of a particular
candidate winning an election, given imperfect information about the preferences of the …

We propose an online form of the cake cutting problem. This models situations where agents
arrive and depart during the process of dividing a resource. We show that well known fair …

Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules
have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical …

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint
actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot …

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents.
Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate the result by mis-reporting their preferences …

We study the problem of computing possible and necessary winners for partially specified
weighted and unweighted tournaments. This problem arises naturally in elections with …

In multiagent settings where agents have different preferences, preference aggregation can
be an important issue. Voting is a general method to aggregate preferences. We consider …

ABSTRACT A possible winner of an election is a candidate that has, in some kind of
incomplete-information election, the possibility to win in a complete extension of the election …