The wolf at the door: The impact of hedge fund activism on corporate governance

JC Coffee Jr, D Palia - Annals of Corporate Governance, 2016 - nowpublishers.com
Hedge fund activism has increased almost hyperbolically. Although some view this trend
optimistically as a means for bridging the separation of ownership and control, we review the …

Executive personality, capability cues, and risk taking: How narcissistic CEOs react to their successes and stumbles

A Chatterjee, DC Hambrick - Administrative science …, 2011 - journals.sagepub.com
We adopt an interactionist logic to study the determinants of risk taking by chief executive
officers (CEOs). We introduce the concept of “capability cues”—contextual signals that …

[图书][B] The economic structure of corporate law

FH Easterbrook, DR Fischel - 1996 - books.google.com
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel argue that the rules and practices of corporate law
mimic the contractual provisions that investors, managers, and others involved in a …

[图书][B] Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation

L Bebchuk, JM Fried - 2006 - degruyter.com
As this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced
widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting …

Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate monitor

JC Coffee Jr - Colum. L. Rev., 1991 - HeinOnline
Within academia, paradigm shifts occur regularly, some more important than others. As the
takeover wave of the 1980s ebbs,'a significant shift now appears to be in progress in the way …

Merger motives and merger prescriptions

F Trautwein - Strategic management journal, 1990 - Wiley Online Library
The article surveys theories of merger motives and relates them to prescriptions for merger
strategies. The theories of merger motives can be classified into seven groups. Those …

Agents watching agents: The promise of institutional investor voice

BS Black - UCLA l. Rev., 1991 - HeinOnline
AGENTS WATCHING AGENTS: THE PROMISE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR VOICE Bernard
S. Black* Page 1 AGENTS WATCHING AGENTS: THE PROMISE OF INSTITUTIONAL …

Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest

E Elhauge - NyUL Rev., 2005 - HeinOnline
Let's start concrete before we get theoretical. Suppose clear-cut-ting is profitable and legal,
but is nonetheless regarded as environmentally irresponsible under prevailing social norms …

Στρατηγική των επιχειρήσεων και διοίκηση ολικής ποιότητας

ΣΚ Παπασπύρου - 2009 - dione.lib.unipi.gr
Η παρούσα εργασία έχει ως στόχο να παρουσιάσει τη στρατηγική ανάλυση του ομίλου
«Γρηγόρης Μικρογεύματα ΑΒΕΕ», αφού πρώτα αναλύσει σε θεωρητική βάση το μοντέλο …

Law and administration after Chevron

CR Sunstein - Colum. L. Rev., 1990 - HeinOnline
Throughout its brief history, administrative law has often been concerned with the question
whether the name of its own subject is an oxymoron. We might distinguish among three …