Recommendation, information retrieval, and other information access systems pose unique
challenges for investigating and applying the fairness and non-discrimination concepts that …

This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous
preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite …

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among
efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze …

Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory
of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world …

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching
mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is …

Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often
take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to …

The existence of envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) allocations is a fundamental open
problem in discrete fair division. The goal is to determine the existence of an allocation of a …

Matching problems under preferences have been studied widely in mathematics, computer
science and economics, starting with the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962). A …