We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even
when players participate in multiple mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define …

We study multi-unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint, a situation very
common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature …

In settings where players have limited access to liquidity, represented in the form of budget
constraints, efficiency maximization has proven to be a challenging goal. In particular, the …

A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-
constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible …

We study multi-unit auctions in social networks, where each buyer has a fixed budget and
can spread the sale information to the network neighbors. We design a mechanism …

This paper examines position auctions with budget-constrained advertisers, a dominant
bidding environment used by publishers to allocate positions in online advertising. Budget …

We study envy-free (EF) mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with budgeted agents that
approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder …

Auctions for perishable goods such as Internet ad inventory need to make real-time
allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner …

We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are
complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual …

We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design—designing game-theoretic
mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms …