This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory
of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world …

We give a characterization of the set of group‐strategyproof, Pareto‐optimal, and
reallocation‐proof allocation rules for the assignment problem, where individuals are …

We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at
Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in …

We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the
large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We
survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their …

We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a
subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon). Agents may …

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to
consume more than one object and monetary transfers are not possible. Each agent …

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without
monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains …

A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory
and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book …