This paper takes steps toward integrating firm theory in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz
(1972) and Grossman and Hart (1986), contract theory in the spirit of Holmstrom (1979), and …

Abstract Holmstrom (Bell J Econ 13: 324–340, 1982) argues that a principal is required to
restrain moral hazard in a team: wasting output in certain states is required to enforce …

This paper considers incentive-constrained efficient contractual matching in the presence of
moral hazard. Teams/firms of finite individuals form in order to produce stochastic output in …

This paper considers incentive-constrained efficient contractual matching of individuals in
the presence of moral hazard. By considering an economy with finite number of individuals …

I study two way effects between financial markets and other contractual agreements, such as
compensation packages within a firm, or mortgages and loans. I construct a model with …

I merge the standard Principal Agent model with a CAPM-type financial market, to study the
interactions of contracts and financial markets. I prove existence of equilibrium in two …