Increasingly, more school districts across the United States are using centralized admissions
for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first …

As school districts integrate charter schools for centralized admissions in Denver, New
Orleans, Newark and Washington DC, some schools have stayed out. We provide a new …

For student-college matching problem, we first define a class of free-style DA algorithms,
and then establish their equivalence in producing the matching outcome of Student Optimal …

Many matching markets run clearinghouses that impose quotas to achieve some desirable
allocation. Achieving quotas that are not satisfied by any stable allocation requires …

In many settings, market designers must contend with the presence of firms which they do
not directly control and who do not participate in the “designed” portion of the market. We …

This dissertation studies how and when the design and implementation of market allocations
affects the market's ability to induce agents to participate and truthfully reveal their …

We study the efficiency of a centralized college admissions platform that operates jointly with
a decentralized “off-platform” aftermarket. We exploit a policy change in 2012 in which a …